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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BAILEY BIRD, MIDTOWN AUTO
PARTS, STEVEN SURREY, and
THE ATHENIAN RESTAURANT,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

Case No. 16647

vs.
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action to determine whether Stevensen
has the power under a written lease and pursuant to a
previous lower court judgment to arrange parking on the
leasehold property and to erect a fence on his own property.
The written lease giving rise to this action
was executed in 1961 when Stevensen originally leased
the parking area and access thereto from respondent Bailey
Bird who reserved 26 parking stalls on the leasehold
property for himself and other of his tenants.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to the court which held
that Stevensen did not have the power to rearrange the
parking configuration and to erect a fence on his own
property notwithstanding provisions of the lease and
rulings of a prior court decision to the contrary.

The

lower court also held that respondents had standing to
sue even though there was no testimony or document
introduced to show proper standing.

Further, the Court pro-

hibited certain Mt. Fuel Supply Co. employees from using
the leasehold property even though such employees were
patrons of Stevensen.

The lower court also dismissed

Stevensen's counterclaim even though the court had
ordered during trial and on previous agreement of counsel
to reserve the counterclaim to a future proceeding.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Stevensen seeks a reversal of the lower court's
determination that Stevensen does not have the power to
arrange the parking or move the accessway from his own
property to the leasehold property.

In the alternative

Stevensen seeks a reversal of the lower court's determination that respondents have standing to sue and an
order directing the lower court to dismiss respondent's
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-3case.

Stevensen also seeks a reversal of the court's

judgment that his counterclaim be dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In 1961 Respondent Bird and Appellant

Stevensen entered into a lease of the upper two floors
of the premises located at 251 and 253 East 200 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, the parking area to the rear of the
building at said address 10.84 feet wide to the east
of such buildings (the alley way is also known as Goddard
Court).

See plat attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
2.

The lease between Stevensen and Bird,

(Exhibit "P-1") provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a)

Paragraph 5 of the lease on page 4

grants Stevensen the right to grade and blacktop the parking area and to mark and qesignate
the same for the parking of motor vehicles.
Paragraph 5 also reserves the first 26 parking
stalls which can be entered on the leasehold
property for Bird and his tenants.
(b)

Paragraph 7 provides as follows:

Lessee shall have the right during
the term of this lease or any extension
thereof, to relocate the accessway to the
rear of Lessors' buildings from its present
location, Goddard Court, to any other
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convenient location, provided only that
Lessee shall at all times make available
a suitable and adequate access to the rear
of Lessors' building and shall keep a lane
of traffic available for smooth and
efficient inflow and outflow of traffic
to the ramp at the rear of Lessors'
buildings . • . Lessee shall so arrange
the parking area as to not unnecessarily
interfere with the efficient and proper
use of the loading facilities as now established at the rear of Lessors' buildings.
(c)

Paragraph 10 of the lease provides as

follows:
Lessors convenant that Lessees shall
have the quiet enjoyment of the premises
demised herein and shall have the right to,
at Lessee's own expense, construct fences
or other suitable boundary markers to limit
the parking area . . .
3.

Stevensen had previously acquired the

Lorenzo Smith & Sons property just east of Goddard Court
to facilitate

expansion of his athletic club facilities

which included a right of way over Goddard Court.

(T.

90,

98; Defendant's Exhibit D-18, page 1, paragraphs 7 and 8).
See plat attached as Exhibit "A".
4.

Since execution of the lease Stevensen has

used portions of the Smith property and a small portion
of the Bird leasehold property for athletic club facilities
and has used the remaining portion of the Smith property
and most of the Bird leasehold property for various parking
arrangements as needed or required by various circumstances
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-5existing in the area from time to time.

(T. 27, 46,

112, 113).
5.

As the downtown business area grew and

construction of improvements on real property limited the
availability of parking in the immediate area, disputes
over parking locations between Stevensen, Bird, Bird's
tenants and their patrons grew to the point where such
disputes were a regular occurrence jeopardizing persons
and property in the area.
6.

(T. 57, 58, 92, 94, 95).

Parking problems persisted notwithstanding

appellant's efforts to control the situation.

As a result

of these problems, two tenants of the lessor, Mike and
Steve Katsanevas, sued appellant to establish their right
to certain of the 26 parking stalls reserved for the
lessor under the 1961 lease.
7.

The court in the Katsanevas action recognized

the Katsanevases right to some of the 26 reserved parking
stalls and ordered the appellant to make such available to
them, but did not determine the physical location of such
stalls or Stevensen's power to rearrange their location.
(Katsanevas v. Stevensen, Civil No. 226232, judgment p. 2,
paragraph 1) .
8.

Appellant Stevensen thereafter sued the

lessor (Bird) for a determination of his rights under the
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-6lease.

In that action, Stevensen v. Bird, Civil No. 243475,

the court concluded that "the lease does not grant
defendants (Bird) any right or interest in the Smith
property (property Stevensen had purchased from Smith),
(p. 4, paragrah 6 (a) of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law in Stevensen v. Bird, Civil No. 243475), and held that
1. Plaintiffs (Stevensen) are entitled
to and are hereby granted declaratory judgment
declaring the meaning of the lease between
plaintiffs and defendants to grant plaintiffs
the right to rearrange the parking configuration
and also to move all parking from the Smith
property at the rear of lessors' building so
long as plaintiffs comply with the other
provisions of the lease between the parties.
2. The lease between the parties authorizes
plaintiffs to relocate the accessway extending
from Second South to the rear of defendants'
building to any convenient location including its
original location in the confines of Goddard
Court so long as plaintiffs comply with the
other provisions of the lease between the parties.
3. The lease between the parties authorizes
plaintiffs to erect fences which limit and define
the parking areas and access thereto so long as
plaintiffs comply with the other provisions of
the lease between the parties.
(Judgment in the case of Stevensen v. Bird, Supra, at pages
1 and 2).
9.

Pursuant to the provisions of the lease and

said declaratory judgment appellant erected a fence on his
own property line east of Goddard Court, rearranged the
parking configuration so that lessor had the requisite
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-7stalls, and relocated the accessway over Goddard Court.
(T. 99-100).
10.

As a result of appellant's actions, respondents

brought this suit to force appellant to rearrange the
parking to a configuration on both the leasehold property
and appellant's own property, to remove the fence from
appellant's own property, and to relocate the accessway
over appellant's property rather than Goddard Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT DEFENDANT'S
RIGHTS UNDER THE BIRD-STEVENSEN LEASE
WERE ADJUDICATED IN A PRIOR LAWSUIT
AND ARE RES JUDICATA TO THE PLAINTIFFS
IN THIS ACTION, AND IN ITS ULTIMATE
CONSTRUCTION OF STEVENSEN'S RIGHTS
UNDER THAT LEASE.
It has long been the rule that the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive
between parties and their privies in a subsequent action
involving the same subject matter.

Dillard v. McKnight,

34 C.2d 209, 209 P.2d 387 (1949).

Parties are in privity

if there is a mutual or successive relationship to some
property right, or such identification in interest with
one person or another as to represent the same legal
right therein.

Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957 (Utah 1943).

Because respondents Midtown Auto Parts, the Church of
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8Scientology, and The Athenian Restaurant are all
lessees of Bird, they succeed to the rights and limitations
of Bird in the Stevensen and Bird lease.

Bird's tenants'

are therefore in privity with Bird and any adjudication
of the Bird-Stevensen lease is necessarily an adjudication
of their interest in that lease and the rights and
limitations that grow out of such lease.
counsel recognizes such.

Indeed, defense

(See T. 8 7) •

By declaratory judgment in Stevensen v. Bird,
Supra, the Court construed the Stevensen-Bird lease as
giving Stevensen the following authority:
1. Plaintiffs are entitled to and are
hereby granted declaratory judgment declaring
the meaning of the lease between plaintiffs and
defendants to grant plaintiffs the right to
rearrange the parking configuration and also to
move all parking from the Smith property to the
rear of lessor's building so long as plaintiffs
comply with the other provisions of the lease
between the parties.
2. The lease between the parties authorizes
plaintiff to relocate the accessway extending
from Second South to the rear of defendant's
building to any convenient location including
the original location within the confines of
Goddard Court so long as the plaintiffs comply
with the other provisions of the lease between
the parties.
3. The lease between the parties authorizes
the plaintiff to erect fences which limit and
define the parking areas and access thereto so
long as plaintiffs comply with the other
provisions of the lease between the parties.
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-9(Judgment in the case of Stevensen v. Bird, Civil No.
243475, at pages 1 and 2).

The court also held that

Bird had no right in Stevensen's separate property.
(Conclusions of Law, paragraph 6).
Notwithstanding this adjudication of

~tevensen's

rights under the Bird-Stevensen lease, the court below
permanently enjoined appellant from erecting fences on
his own property line

and ordered him to return the

parking configuration to that existing immediately prior
to erection of the new fence on Stevensen's property.

The

judgment of the court below is obviously inconsistent
with the Stevensen v. Bird resolution of the identical issues.
Because Bird's tenants are in privity with Bird on the lease,
the lower court clearly erred in not recognizing that the
issues resolved in Stevensen v. Bird are res judicata to
the parties in this action.
It is clear that respondent Bird in this case
is attempting to effectuate a horizontal appeal of an
issue resolved in a prior lawsuit.

Bird cannot in this

action get a redetermination of Stevensen's rights under
the 1961 lease.

Such a determination has already been made

by a court of competent jurisdiction and an appeal on the
issues there resolved can only be taken from that court.
Consequently, this court should reverse the judgment of the
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-10lower court purporting to redetermine Stevensen's rights
under the 1961 lease and in his own separate property.
Not only did the lower court err in failing
to hold the issues here in dispute as res judicata to
the respondents, but its construction of the lease was
contrary to established legal principles.
It is commonly accepted that a lease must be
construed with reference to the intentions of the parties.
Powerine v. Russell's, Inc., 135 P.2d 906 (1943).

In

finding the intent of the parties the terms of the lease,
however expressed, if unambiguous, are to control the
construction and operation of the lease.
Tenants, § 232(2).

51 CJS, Landlord

Consequently, the clear and unambiguous

language of the lease should have controlled the lower
court's construction of the agreement in this case.
In clear and unambiguous language the 1961 lease
grants Stevensen the right to rearrange the parking configurationon leasehold property and to erect fences to
facilitate

management of the parking area.

Paragraph 5

of the lease permits Stevensen to blacktop the leasehold
and mark it for parking so long as an adequate access is
maintained and 26 parking stalls are reserved for the lessor.
Paragraph 7 grants Stevensen the right to relocate the
accessway to any convenient location, and paragraph 10 gives
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-11Stevensen the "right to erect fences and other suitable
boundary markers to limit the parking area."
The lower court's judgment is patently inconsistent with the express terms of the agreement.

By

ordering Stevensen to remove the fence on his property
and enjoining him from erecting similar fences in the
future (Bird v. Stevensen, Judgment p. 5, paragraph 1)
the court not only affected property not covered by the
lease, but effectively read paragraph 10 out of the lease.
Furthermore, by requiring Stevensen to rearrange the
parking and accessways to a previous configuration the
court completely nullified the effect of paragraphs 5 and
7 of the lease.
Additionally, the obvious purpose for Stevensens
entering the 1961 lease was to utilize the leasehold
property in the conduct of his adjoining

b~siness.

Not-

withstanding such a purpose, the lower court's judgment
erroneously restrained Stevensen from allowing Mountain
Fuel employees to use the leasehold property irrespective
of whether or not they are on the premises as patrons of
Stevensen.
Because the language of the Bird-Stevensen
lease is clear and unambiguous with respect to Stevensen's
rights thereunder, the lower court erred in failing to
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-12enforce the lease by its express terms and in construing
the agreement inconsistently with its clear language.
POINT II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAD STANDING TO
BRING THE PRESENT ACTION.
It is widely recognized that a party seeking
relief must show a clear legal or equitable right and a
well grounded fear of immediate invasion of that right
to bring suit.

State Ex Rel Hays v. Wilson, 17 Wash. 2d

670, 137 P.2d 105 (1943}.

When suing on a prior judgment,

therefore, a party must demonstrate that it is owner of
the judgment either by title appearing on the record or by
some formal transfer.

If a party can demonstrate no such

interest in the prior judgment it cannot maintain suit on
the judgment.

50 CJS, Judgments, § 857.

Thus, in Data

Processing Financial and General Corp. v. IBM Corp., 430
F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970}, a nonparty to a prior suit could
not bring an action asserting defendant's violation of the
prior consent decree, and in Prusa v. Hejduk, 238 P.2d 304
(Okl. 1951}, the heirs of a deceased judgment creditor
could not maintain an action on decedent's judgment because
that right had succeeded to the personal representatives.
Respondents' cause of action in this case is
essentially an action to enforce the judgment in Katsanevas
v. Stevensen, Supra.

Respondents have failed, however, to
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-13present any evidence that they were parties to the
Katsanevas action or that Katsanevas has assigned to
them any rights in that judgment.

Indeed, none of the

respondents had any part in the Katsanevas action.
Consequently, respondents do not have standing to sue on
the judgment and the lower court erred in failing to
dismiss the complaint.
Additionally, Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that every action be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest.

A real party

in interest is one who owns the right being enforced
and is in a position to discharge the defendant from
liability asserted in suit.

State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Co. v. Foundation Reserve Insurance Co., 78 N.M.
780, 427 P.2d 662

(1967).

Only Mike and Steve Katsanevas

have such an interest in the Katsanevas judgment that they
could alter defendant's liability thereunder.

It is clear,

therefore, that the Katsanevases are the only real parties
in interest and without them as plaintiffs, the present
action cannot be maintained.
POINT III. THE COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT
DEFENDANT STEVENSEN DID NOT SHOW SUFFICIENT
CAUSE TO ERECT A FENCE AND REARRANGE THE
PARKING CONFIGURATION WAS ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY
TO THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.
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The lower court in its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law found that Stevensen changed the
parking configuration without sufficient cause thus
violating the court's order entered in the case of
Katsanevas v. Stevensen.

The evidence presented to the

Court below is to the contrary.
Under the Bird-Stevensen lease, Stevensen is to
provide 26 parking stalls on the leasehold property for
Bird and his tenants.

(Defendant Exhibit "18").

It was,

therefore, incumbent upon Mr. Stevensen to control the
parking facility so that Stevensen's patrons did not
deprive Bird or his tenants of their rights under the lease.
Inspite of Mr. Stevensen's efforts to regulate the parking
facility, the evidence at trial demonstrates that parking
conditions were intolerable prior to erection of the
fence on Stevensen's property.

(T. 91).

Patrons of

Bird's tenants constantly parked in Stevensen's stalls,
and Stevensen's patrons ofter parked in the stalls reserved
for Bird and his tenants.

(T. 38, 48, 57).

The situation caused much anxiety and dismay
to Mr. Stevensen and his employees.

Mr. Stevensen was

often threatened for asking patrons of Bird's tenants to
remove their cars from his stalls.

(T. 94, 95).

Likewise,

Mr. Kerr, one of Stevensen's employees, was constantly
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-15harrassed for patroling the parking lot, and on occasion
was the subject of particularly violent threats.
58).

(T. 57,

As a result of these difficult parking conditions,

many of Stevensen's guards and subordinates left his employ.
Respondents did not object to the untenable parking
arrangement because they accepted no responsibility to
control the parking and because without a separation
barrier their patrons had use of Stevensen's parking stalls.
(T. 30, 47-50, 93).
Because of these intolerable parking conditions,
and to better facilitate management of the lot, Stevensen
erected a fence on his property to separate the parking of
Bird and his tenants from that of his own.

Separation of

the accessways necessitated erection of a fence and rearrangement of the parking configuration.

The rearrangement

does not deprive Bird or his tenants of any of the
26 parking stalls reserved for Bird in the 1961 lease,
it only changes their location.

Each relocated stall is

8'6" wide, consistent with the Stevensen v. Bird order,
and the rearrangement is consistent in all other respects
with the particulars required by the lease and prior court
orders.

(T. 98).

Since making these modifications the

parking problems referred to above have subsided considerably.
Patrons of Bird's tenants generally park on the west side
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-16of the fence now and Stevensen's patrons park on the east
side.

(T. 59, 115).
Plaintiff's contention that the present parking

configuration is inconvenient is not sufficient to overcome defendant's overwhelming evidence indicating that the
new configuration resolves the parking problems and
complies in whole with previous court orders.

The

realligned accessway is 10.84 feet wide, the original width
of Goddard Court, and (T. 99), sufficiently wide for
use by any truck complying with the 8 foot Utah width
limitation.

Indeed, the evidence indicates that delivery

vans, a large garbage truck, and a large linen truck
negotiate the accessway almost daily.
85, 106).

(T. 60, 61, 69-70,

Mr. Kerr, an experienced truck driver, testified

that he could take a tractor with a 26' trailor down the
accessway, turn around behind Bird's building, and then
exit again.

(T. 63-64).

In light of this and other evidence submitted
at trial, it is clear that Mr. Stevensen had extreme good
cause to erect the fence and rearrange the parking configuration, and that such action is consistent in whole
with prior court orders.

Defendant respectfully submits

that the lower court erred in finding otherwise.
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-17POINT IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED BECAUSE
ITS ORDER EXPANDED THE RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENTS
TO INCLUDE RIGHTS IN STEVENSEN'S PROPERTY NOT
COVERED BY THE LEASE.
Prior to execution of the Stevensen-Bird lease
in 1961, and at all times subsequent thereto, Stevensen
has owned property adjoining Goddard Court on the east
(Goddard Court being 10.84 foot right of way running
north and south directly east of Bird's

bu~lding,

see

plaintiff's Exhibit "11"), and a 1/2 interest in the
10.84 foot right of way over Goddard Court.
Exhibit "18", pp. 1-2; T. 90).

(Defendant's

By lease agreement dated

November 21, 1961, Stevensen acquired from Bird the other
1/2 interest in the right of way over Goddard Court.
(T. 90, 106-108).

Neither the 1961 lease nor any other

document grants plaintiff Bird any interest in defendant
Stevensen's adjoining property.
Furthermore, the court in Stevensen v. Bird, stated
in its Conclusion of Law that, "The lease does not grant
defendants (Bird) any right or interest in the Smith
property (property Stevensen purchased from Smith)."
(p. 4, paragraph 6(a) of Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law in the case of Stevensen v. Bird, Supra).

Indeed,

the judgment of that court specifically recognized that
Bird had no interest in Stevensen's property by permitting
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Stevensen to remove all parking and accessways from his
own property and relocate them on the leasehold property.
(p. 1, paragraph 1 of Judgment in the case of Stevensen v.
Bird, Supra.).

Neither can it be argued that the Court in

Katsanevas v. Stevensen granted Bird or his tenants any
rights in Stevensen's own property.

The order in Katsanevas

was concerned solely with Stevensen's alleged encroachment
on the Katsanevas parking stalls covered in the lease, not
with the physical location of the stalls.

{Katsanevas v.

Stevensen, Civil No. 226232, order dated March 21, 1975
and July 1, 1975).
It is hornbook law that a lessee cannot acquire
any greater rights in the leasehold property than are held
by the lessor.
1955).

Smith v. Woolsey, 137 N.E.2d 632 (Ohio Appls.

Bird is the only respondent in this action in

contractual privity with Stevensen.

The plaintiff tenants

of Bird, therefore, cannot succeed to any greater rights
in the Stevensen-Bird lease than plaintiff Bird possesses.
Consequently, because Bird has no rights in Stevensen's
property by the lease, none of the other respondents have
any such right by the lease.
Notwithstanding respondents' lack of interest in
Stevensen's adjoining property, the court below ordered
Stevensen to remove the fence located completely on his
own property (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-19Judgment, p. 5, T. 99-107), and to rearrange the
to its previous configuration, thereby mandating
Stevensen to utilize his own property for Bird's parking
and accessway.

(See judgment p. 5 and Exhibit "A" to the

judgment; defendant's Exhibit "19").
The lower court has gone far beyond merely
construing the Bird-Stevensen lease or enforcing a prior
judgment.

By requiring Stevensen to remove his fence

and rearrange the parking configuration the lower court
has impliedly granted respondents a right to Stevensen's
property not heretofore vested in them.

In doing so, the

lower court erred and should be reversed as a matter of
law.
POINT V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM WITH
PREJUDICE AFTER STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES
AND ORDER OF THE COURT ITSELF DEFERRING
TRIAL OF THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR ANOTHER HEARING.
Prior to trial of the instant case, the court
and counsel for both parties, in chambers, agreed to
defer trial of Stevensen's counterclaim to a future date.
The stipulation was confirmed at trial and preserved
in the record as follows:
The Court:
. the question involved -involving damages and those raised by the
counterclaim, I suppose, can be reserved -deferred until another hearing, is that correct,
Mr. Smay?
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Mr. Smay:

That is correct, your Honor.

The Court:
Mr. Neider:
(T.

Mr. Neider?
That is correct, your Honor.

2) •

The court's judgment, however, dismissed Stevensen's counterclaim with prejudice.

Inclusion of the order

dismissing the counterclaim in the judgment is clearly a
clerical error.

Appellant objected to the error when

opposing counsel submitted the proposed judgment, but
to no avail.

Counsel for appellant would have sought

correction of the error pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure except that the judgment
provided for injunctive relief within five (5) days thereby
necessitating an instant appeal.

Consequently, the error

should be corrected by this court reversing the lower court's
judgment dismissing Stevensen's counterclaim.

CONCLUSION
The lower court's order recognizing respondents'
standing to sue should be reversed and the suit dismissed
because no respondent was a party to the order which they
seek to enforce nor do they have any legal or eauitable
interest therein.

If the Supreme Court finds for the

respondent on the standing issue, the judgment of the lower
court ordering appellant to remove the subject fence and
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-21rearrange the parking to its previous configuration
should be reversed and judgment entered for the appellant
for any of the following reasons:
1.

Appellant's rights respecting erection of

fences and rearrangement of parking configuration on the
subject premises were decided in Stevensen v. Bird, Civil
No. 243475 and are res judicata to respondents.
2.

The lower court erroneously construed

the lease contrary to terms which clearly and unambiguously
grant Stevensen the right to rearrange parking configuration
and accessways and to erect fences.
3.

The lower court's verdict was premised on a

finding that appellants did not have sufficient cause to
rearrange the parking which finding is contrary to the
evidence.
4.

The lower court's order goes beyond respondents'

rights under the lease and any previous court order, and
grants to them rights in appellant Stevensen's property
which are non-existent.
Additionally, the lower court's judgment
dismissing appellant's counterclaims should be reversed
because the court itself ordered deferral of hearing
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-22on the counterclaim pursuant to agreement of counsel
for both parties.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of
January, 1980.
WATKINS & FABER
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WAt'TER P. FABER, Jw.'°
MICHAEL A. NEIDER
BARRE G. BURGON
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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